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This paper starts with the premise that one of the possible solutions 
to state fragility is development from within, which is achieved 
partly through civil society and states’ self-help. It begins with the 
definitions used in this paper, and then tries to establish very briefly 
the relationship between civil society and state fragility. Then, it 
tries to determine what civil society could do to reconstruct fragile 
states in general. Finally, it applies parts of the latter to Angola, 
examining the successes and failures of its civil society, while 
focusing only on the role of NGOs. Through this methodology, it 
tries to answer the question “To what extent is Civil Society 
successful in reconstructing/rebuilding Angola as a Fragile State?”. 
This topic is significant because state fragility is on the rise, and is 
hard to control. The paper argues that although Angolan civil 
society is rather limited and weakened by the state and international 
organizations, there are opportunities for increasing its 
effectiveness. It might not be significantly successful today, but with 
all limitations considered, it is bringing about small positive changes 
that will impact the future of Democracy in Angola in the long run.  
 
Relationship between Civil Society and State 
Fragility 
 
‘Failed States’ is a term that gained resonance in the 
early 1990s (Nay, 2012, p. 1). Since then, it triggered 
                                                          
* An earlier version of this paper was prepared for POLS 3510, Section 01, 
taught by Professor Rabab El Mahdi. 
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academic debate over what it really means, who defines 
the degree of failure and whose agenda does the term 
serve. The hegemonic school is the North American 
school and it uses the term to specifically describe severe 
political crises the happened in the 1990s (Besada & 
Hannan, 2007, p. 2). Jean-Germain Gros (1996) 
categorized failed states into five types. There are 
‘anarchic states’ that lack centralized government and 
‘phantom states’ which have a semblance of authority 
but no real one. There are also ‘anemic states’ which are 
states that lack the state spirit, ‘captured states’ which 
are states dominated by insecure rivaling elites and 
finally, there is the ‘in vitro’ or aborted states which 
failed before the emergence of a state machine (Besada 
& Hannan, 2007, p. 2-3). In contrast to the North 
American school, the European and Institutional 
literature frown upon the term ‘Failed State’ (Besada & 
Hannan,2007, p. 3). It is claimed that it’s a term that 
refers to the periphery, providing a theoretical 
underpinning and a diplomatic justification behind the 
intervention of the Global North in the domestic affairs 
of the ‘underdeveloped South’ pushing for neoliberal 
policies.  
 
According to William Zartman (1995) and Robert 
Rotberg (2003), whose school of thought is advocated in 
this paper, state fragility is simply an assessment of how 
a state is performing its tasks and responsibilities. The 
tasks vary from securing essential freedoms, building 
infrastructure, protecting territories and borders, 
maintaining internal security to sustaining economic 
growth and providing public goods such as sanitation 
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and education (Rotberg, 2003, p. 7). According to 
Rotberg, a state is fragile if it does not meet a ‘certain’ 
threshold (Rotberg, 2003, p. 1). Failure and collapse 
happen when the “structure, authority, law and political 
order” cease to be effective (Pegg, 1996, p. 238). A state 
does not have to meet its tasks to completion but if it 
fails to meet highly weighted and important fronts, then 
it is categorized as a fragile state (Rotberg, 2003, p. 4). 
In this paper, the Fragile State Index is used as a 
quantitative measure of fragility. Formerly known as the 
Failed State Index, the Fragile State Index is an annual 
index and report introduced by The Fund for Peace and 
was used by Foreign Policy magazine a little over a 
decade ago.  
The literature asserts that fragile states do not develop 
overnight and hence reconstruction of fragile states takes 
time, partly because of the complexity of the problems 
causing the fragility (Pegg, 1996, p. 238). The 
international community needs to intervene and help in 
reconstructing those states because fragility overspills 
and the crisis they breed are transnational problems. We 
do not live in a vacuum and hence, countries should 
cooperate to reconstruct fragile states.  
During the 1990s, and after the end of the Cold War, the 
world order shifted. The emergence of a new world order 
in addition to the already existing domestic problems 
induced by the war brought about drastic changes to 
which some states failed to cope with. These problems 
ranged from civil wars, to the inability to secure citizens, 
to economic recession and territorial losses (Nay, 2012, 
p. 1). Countries were expected to resolve conflict 
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through the UN (Tabbush, 2005, p. 10). However, the 
world witnessed series of the worst atrocities since the 
Holocaust in which UNSC stood helpless, failing those 
who were in dire need for help, as, for example, the 
Srebrenica massacre during the Bosnian genocide 
(1995). Before and parallel to the conflict in Kosovo, 
were the Somalia crisis (1992) and the Rwandan 
genocide (1994), amongst other traumatizing conflicts. 
With the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, most of the 
crises took place in Africa.  
 
After the African wave of independence during the 
1960s, there was a trend of constant military coups, 
instability, lack of state legitimacy, malnutrition and 
starvation, poverty, inequality, ethnic violence, brutal 
international intervention and breached mandates. 
Parallel to these deeply rooted problems was the HIV 
epidemic which was on the rise since the 1980s, 
worsening the situation further. All this qualified African 
countries to top the State Fragility Index, while the need 
for reconstruction became more grave and apparent.  
 
The mechanism through which reconstruction was 
attempted during the 1990s was arguably limited 
because there is only so much the UN could do. UN 
members often cooperate through fiscal aid and 
supplying peacekeeping missions with a workforce. 
However, sometimes aid or foreign intervention are not 
enough in eradicating the roots of fragility especially in 
the case of a cultural crisis such as ethnic conflict or 
gender-based violence. This is where civil society or 
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reconstruction from within the fragile state factors in the 
equation.  
 
The term ‘civil society’ dates back to the Greek era 
where it was defined as the realm parallel to but separate 
from the state (Carothers, 1999-2000, p. 18).  It did not 
gain an edge until the post-World War Two era when 
Antonio Gramsci defined it as an entity that was 
politically independent from the state, directing all its 
efforts against totalitarian regimes (Carothers, 1999-
2000, p. 19). Academically, the use of the term peaked in 
the post-Cold War period.  
 
According to Maha Abdelrahman (2004), civil society is 
defined as the space that exists outside the market, the 
state and the family (Abdelrahman,  2004, p. 41). It is 
the ‘reservoir of formal and informal organizations’ such 
trade, labor unions and syndicates, state-independent 
Mosques and Churches, book clubs, blog spheres and 
alternative media as well as NGOs and associations. 
(Posner, 2004. p. 237; Carothers, 1999-2000, p. 19-20). 
In ‘NGOs in the Contemporary World Order’, 
Abdelrahman discussed the evolution of the definition 
across the decades starting with the premise that the 
definition is a negative residual category. It is basically 
what is automatically left out of the major three spheres 
of power: state, family and the market.  
 
Although theoretically, civil society is commonly 
defined as a nonpolitical entity, it is not, because it needs 
the political sphere to manifest its work and channel its 
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efforts (Tabbush, 2005, p. 10). In simpler terms, civil 
society needs the state machine. Mike Davis argues that 
civil society even helps the state. It diverts attention from 
structural adjustment adopted by the government (Davis, 
2007, p. 77). He also argued that civil society, and 
specifically NGOs, became a façade to perpetuate 
inequality, lack of wealth distribution and failure of the 
government to solve problems created by soft 
imperialism and the neoliberal model (Davis, 2007, p. 
82; Ghaus-Pasha, 2005, p. 10). 
Parallel to and partly as a result of neoliberal leaps in the 
1980s and 1990s, the emphasis on civil society was more 
directed to NGOs and the role they ‘had’ to play in 
development and political change. This is when NGOs 
witnessed a surge in their duties and an evolution of their 
relationship with the state becoming more ‘embedded’. 
Their influence grew and they actively contributed in the 
development of different countries (Ghaus-Pasha, 2005, 
p. 4). According to Abdelrahman, civil society and 
specifically NGOs were promoted partly by the 
neoliberal model as less corrupt entities compared to the 
state and the market. They were perceived to be more 
efficient, less bureaucratic and more responsive and 
receptive to society’s demands and people’s needs than 
the state ever was (Abdelrahman, 2004, p. 51-58). They 
were also advertised to be ‘small’ structures which 
facilitates communication and delegation from within the 
structure as opposed to the nepotistic, inefficient 
bureaucracy governments rely on. They are deemed to be 
the ‘best’ way to overcome the shortcomings and 
limitations of the state (Posner, 2004. P. 237). According 
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to Daniel Posner, civil society is perceived to have 
‘magical’ solutions to deeply rooted problems that states 
do not have the capabilities to solve (Posner, 2004. P. 
237). This all contributed to the development of a 
romanticized version of civil society. It also led to the 
increasing significance of its work parallel to state 
shrinkage around the globe.  
 
Fragile states have their share of the ‘deeply rooted 
problems’ Posner discussed. Civil society is 
automatically expected to seize the reins, figuratively 
and literally, solving these crises because not only is the 
state limited by its structure, but it’s ‘fragile’ and 
incapable of performing its tasks. There are two main 
mechanisms through which civil society works in 
general: substitution and advocacy (Posner, 2004. P. 
239). Substitution is where civil society completely 
substitutes the state whereas advocacy is where it 
advocates its role, spearheading national projects while 
the state still maintains power over civil society. In the 
case of fragile states, it is not sufficient that civil society 
advocates the role of the state (Dowst, 2009, p. 6). It is 
expected to be strong, organized and capable of 
substituting the state complementing and customizing its 
effort to the level of fragility. This establishes a positive 
relationship between the two variables: state fragility and 
civil society.  
 
Having civil society substitute the state machine shows 
how the former can significantly affect fragile states 
because it becomes civil society’s mission to perform the 
states’ tasks: protect its population and provide public 
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goods such as education, sanitation, public health and 
infrastructure. The shift of roles is arguably not easy and 
it is hard to pinpoint when it exactly happens. During 
times of crises, states’ shrinkage and fragility becomes 
more apparent and civil society, normatively, fills in the 
vacuum. However, this is not always the case. 
Sometimes, fragile states deliberately weaken civil 
society through repression and alienation which results 
in a hectic, and often brutal and incomplete transition, 
leaving the state in a limbo like Somalia today. Also it 
depends on the level of fragility. This all affects the 
significance and span of power civil society has and it 
dictates its role to a high extent especially when civil 
society is not a solitary, homogenous unit.  
 
How can Civil Society reconstruct fragile states? 
 
One could argue that civil society organizations (CSO) 
do not use the same approach tackling different causes of 
fragility.. For instance, what a CSO could do in a fragile 
state where corruption and unemployment are the main 
concerns, is drastically different from what it could bring 
about when the state is plagued with ethnic conflict 
which require a certain maneuver in tackling because its 
scars run deeper. Hence, this section will briefly discuss 
possible opportunities for involvement of civil society 
within fragile states in general.  
 
Also this paper adopts the post-conflict perspective 
which focuses on what could civil society do to 
reconstruct the ‘already’ fragile state. (Dowst, 2009, p. 
8) (Santos, 2002, p. 43). It is where civil society is 
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involved in the peace and nation-building processes 
which follow the problems that partly contributed to the 
fragility. It is argued that civil society cannot work in a 
fragile state that lacks security and basic infrastructure 
(Posner, 2004,  p. 46); even though this is debatable, this 
paper adopts this understanding. Angola was selected 
because it survived ethnic conflict and it is highly 
fragile. However it has not reached the fragility level 
where there is a lack of security or total destruction of 
infrastructure which gives civil society the ‘space’ to 
achieve reconstruction, as one could see in the appendix 
below. 
 
One of the key steps that civil society needs to take is 
developing flexibility and operability with other 
state/nation-building institutions (Uvin & Cohen, 2006, 
p. 3). It is important for CSOs not to work in isolation or 
separate themselves from other institutions, because the 
complexity of the issues that contribute to fragility needs 
simultaneous tackling through several fronts. In fragile 
states, society is broken apart. Community-based 
projects are often what keeps it going (World Bank, 
2005, P. 1). Working against them can be adding to the 
damage and cementing it. Civil society needs to 
cooperate and compliment other efforts to guarantee a 
level of consistency and possibly a faster, and a more 
efficient process of reconstruction because in the context 
of fragile states, time is usually not on civil society’s 
side. Fragility is likely to be uncontrollable and the race 
downwards can be unstoppable and hence there is a need 
for an organized and a realistic plan that civil society can 
achieve in partnership with other institutions (Posner, 
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2004, p. 46). They do not need to have uniformity of 
mission statements and goals but they need to have the 
same vision and they need to cooperate (World Banks, 
2005, p. 8). In fragile states, conflict between groups is 
likely to be high. If conflict spreads between civil society 
organizations, reconstruction becomes even harder to 
achieve.  
 
As a result, civil society organizations need to be 
involved in the national dialogue tackling more than one 
front of the crises causing the fragility (Uvin & Cohen, 
2006, p. 3). They need to communicate effectively 
through a ‘national dialogue’ that has a realistic end date 
and a clear agenda. National dialogues have tendencies 
to drag on and thus the need for clear planning. CSOs 
need a bottom-up approach where they work at the 
grassroots levels especially in countries suffering from 
sectarian and ethnic divides. They need to learn how to 
initiate transitional justice through culture change 
programmes and to be able to mediate the group 
grievances because they hurdle the reconstruction 
process. 
 
Another thing civil society needs to do is to assist the 
efforts of the government empowering it rather than 
limiting its power (Uvin & Cohen, 2006, p. 3). Civil 
society needs to reassume its role as the ‘watchdog’ 
rather than the state substitute and it needs to shift again 
the executive power to the state. Once it regains its 
advocacy, it needs to monitor the state especially in 
regards to corruption and Human Rights violations for 
the grave risks associated with them. It needs to also 
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mobilize the social spheres to pressure the government to 
be more transparent and responsive to the masses’ needs 
(Uvin & Cohen, 2006, p. 3). This can be hard to achieve 
amidst fragility but it is essential because both corruption 
and Human Rights violations have deep roots and are 
hard to eradicate. There has to be consistent supervision 
and monitoring which civil society is by default 
equipped to perform.   
 
Civil society could also mediate between the society and 
foreign intervention (World Bank, 2005, P. 6). Fragile 
states’ are often fertile ground for intervention. A strong 
civil society is likely to mitigate the extent of 
intervention and control it to some extent. It needs to be 
aware of what is expected out of this intervention and 
follow it through. Their contribution is significant 
because it is the voice of the local and assuming that the 
intervention has ‘noble’ intentions, its mandate and 
capabilities are likely to be limited if civil society is not 
capable of voicing its demands clearly, reflecting what 
the locals need.  
 
Civil Society and State Fragility in Angola. 
 
The post-conflict perspective starts in 2002 after the end 
of a brutal civil war that lasted on Angolan ground for 
almost 27 years (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 4). During 
the 1960s, battles against the Portuguese colonizer in 
Angola erupted (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 4). However 
the conflict quickly spiraled into a civil war between the 
liberation movements fighting to fill the power vacuum. 
The Portuguese colonizer did not prepare their colonies 
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for independence which left Angola unprepared for and 
exposed to the problems associated with transitional 
periods such as inflation, economic depression, 
unemployment and violence. What worsened the 
situation further was the ‘primordial’ ethnic tension 
between several groups (Rocha, 2002, p. 3). In 1975, 
Angola gained formal independence but was further 
submersed in ruthless fighting (Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 
538). It was mainly between The Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) who supported the 
government and the liberation movements: The National 
Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and, most 
importantly, The National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Vines & Weimer, 
2011, p. 4; Rocha, 2002, p. 3). 
 
The war was prolonged by foreign intervention, as the 
USSR supported UNITA and the ‘West’ supported the 
FNLA and the rebels. In 1977, there was a failed attempt 
to overthrow Angola’s first president who was a member 
in MPLA (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 5). The failed coup 
increased the instability, heightened the group 
grievances and severed the ties between the different 
groups (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 5). Demographically, 
the peasants and the poor were severely marginalized by 
the urban led MPLA (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 5). 
UNITA resorted to guerilla tactics to undermine 
MPLA’s power, worsening the divide between the urban 
and rural further as they aided the rural against MPLA’s 
urban masses which had devastating results. 
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The element of ethnicity is a significant contributor to 
Angola’s fragility. Moreover, the civil war brought about 
other plagues to the already weakened society, 
maintaining the high fragility values. By 2007, there was 
over a million out of 17.7 million Angolans relying on 
the UN Food programme to stay alive, while 3.7 million 
were put on war-victims programmes (Kibble,  & Vines, 
2001, p.538).  In addition, about 70,000 Angolans lost 
their limbs (Kibble, S., & Vines, A., 2001, P.538). Two 
to four million Angolans were internally displaced and 
hundreds of thousands fled their homes and sought 
refuge in other African states (Kibble & Vines, 2001, 
p.538). 
 
Also, Angola was reported to be one of the worst 
countries in terms of health and sanitation. The mortality 
rate, in 2007, for children under five was 30 per cent 
(Kibble & Vines, 2001, p.538).  Only one in every five 
could attain sanitation. Only one in three had access to 
clean water (Rocha, 2002, pp. 1-2). In 1999, the 
government spent only 1.5% of Angola’s GDP on health 
programmes, which is appalling, and yet consistent with 
the mortality rates, and what was reported regarding 
health in 2007 (Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 538). The 
annual inflation rate was set at 3,000 per cent which 
caused tension and added to people’s misery and poverty 
because of the rising prices and the minimal wages 
(Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 538).  It was no coincidence 
to find that half of the Angolan children were not in 
schools, which is significant because 45% of the 
Angolan Population were below the age 14 back then 
(Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 538). It it also interesting to 
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look at government budgets and how they were 
distributed: Before 2007, the Angolan government 
allocated 7% to education as opposed to 33% for 
security (Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 538).  Those are all 
manifestations of fragility which was represented in a 
fragility score of 84.9/100 in 2007 (see Appendix 
below).  
 
It is important to establish that none of those problems 
are alien to African countries. Most African countries 
share the same problems, to different degrees. Angola’s 
not an outlier, since it has maintained roughly the same 
levels of fragility since 2006. Figure number one, and 
the table in the Appendix below show the extent of 













2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Year 
Angolan  State Fragility Scores 
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It might be argued that it is challenging to trace the 
outcomes of civil society efforts directly. However, these 
could be analyzed over a long term period. One could 
see, for instance, that in 2008 the degree of fragility 
decreased rather significantly which can be surprising 
after the statistics provided above for 2007. I thought it 
could be useful to trace civil society efforts before 2008 
and 2010 (when another drop in fragility values 
happened) to understand what possibly could have 
induced the change.  
 
One could argue that before 1990s, the Angolan state 
controlled all affairs in an iron grip. With the fall of the 
USSR, MPLA was no longer internationally backed up 
by a superpower and it was ‘forced’ to liberalize legally 
in 1991 which was an opportunity for civil society to 
grow (Chatham House, 2005, p. 9). The Angolan civil 
society witnessed the emergence of the FONGA (Forum 
of Angolan NGOs) as the umbrella for all ‘authentic’ 
Angolan voices (Chatham House, 2005, p. 9). It 
showcases one of the successes of Angolan civil society 
because it was able to guarantee some level of 
operability with other NGOs which was discussed above 
in the second section of this paper. It remained limited 
and subordinated though as an automatic result of the 
dominance of the international NGOs and their 
involvement. Compared to other African countries, the 
emergence of the Angolan civil society was slow yet 
steady. There were no sudden changes which is actually 
consistent with the trend describing Angolan fragility 
values which remained in the same range since the 
creation of the fragility index in 2006. 
15
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National NGOs in Angola focus mainly on human and 
political rights and social development. They allocate 
their focus to attain transparency and pressure the 
government to open up and declare their 
acknowledgement of basic human rights. They were 
successful to some extent, as they embedded a new set of 
values (Chatham House, 2005, p. 14). Today, there is 
consensus regarding the need for ‘democratization’. 
Angola had not held elections since 1992 (Chatham 
House, 2005, p. 14). Despite this, the masses are aware 
of how corrupt their government is. NGOs were 
successful in promoting the weaknesses of the 
government and how it can be malleable to liberalization 
in the beginning and then democratization later. One of 
the main reasons why there is hope for civil society to 
grow stronger and further contribute to the 
reconstruction of Angola, is the weak state. Angola has a 
very weak government that is decentralized and more 
interested in ‘formal’ power gains (Chatham House, 
2005, p. 14). Angolan civil society has the capabilities 
and the opportunity to bring about full-fledged change 
because of the extent of state weakness. This all marks 
another sign of success because they have the awareness.  
 
There are approximately about 100 International NGOs 
working in Angola and 300 national ones (Amundsen & 
Abreu, 2006, p. 10). This is a relatively high number 
keeping in mind that Angola does not have very high 
population density. It is significant to see a relatively 
high number of NGOs coming together and working 
cooperatively on political rights and awareness. They 
raise awareness about the need for transparency, justice, 
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constitutional reform, institutional meritocracy and 
freedom of expression and assembly (Amundsen & 
Abreu, 2006, p. 10). In 2000, Angola witnessed the 
emergence of two major organizations advocating 
justice. The first was Mãos Livres, supported by the UN 
Human Rights Division (Chatham House, 2005, p. 14). 
The other was AJPD which was founded by Angolan 
youth groups who had a catholic background and 
supported the penal system, constitutional reform and 
HIV legislations (Chatham House, 2005, p. 14). They 
used the media and street mobilization to put forward 
their beliefs. This reflects the success of domestic NGOs 
who accomplished operability with international 
organizations.  
 
Another sign of relative success of NGOs’ work in 
Angola is inducing harmony between different groups 
(Santos, 2002, p. 47). When looking at fragility index 
values (Appendix), one could see that the group 
grievances are relatively low. Sources assert that since 
2002 onwards, the civil strife diminished and NGOs 
were able to encourage tolerance and acceptance of the 
Other to some extent (Santos, 2002, p. 47). There are 
other important factors contributing to the decreased 
ethnic tension such as its origins for instance, but NGOs 
are major actors that were able to stop such conflict from 
spiraling out of control again which is easy to achieve 
especially with Angola having its share of civil war for 
decades. 
 
There might not be empirical results yet of NGOs work 
on the ground, as the government still has not held 
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elections. However, there is rising awareness in Angola 
which could be seen as weak progress but progress it is 
nonetheless because, besides raising awareness, CSOs 
managed to induce harmony between different groups 
and push for liberalization. Tangible achievements in 
social development include a better heath programme 
(Affolter  & Cabula, 2010, p. 277) that includes care for 
HIV and Malaria. There are also concrete results in 
education. Domestic NGOs have allocated their efforts 
to work parallel to UNDP in a campaign for Civic 
Education in order to bring Angolans together and to 
also spread awareness about their political rights 
(Affolter, & Cabula, 2010, p. 279). One could argue that 
Angola is still in the process of state-building which 
leaves a lot of opportunity for civil society to operate. 
However, domestic NGOs’ capabilities are limited to 
some extent. When reading about the logistics of civics 
campaign, one would realize that UNDP is in control 
(Affolter  & Cabula, 2010, p. 276). It is understandable 
that UNDP may have more experience with education on 
grounds than local NGOs, however it is arguably 
infringing on domestic NGOs’ autonomy. 
 
Also, the Angolan state does not acknowledge NGOs or 
civil society efforts in general (Santos, 2002, p. 48). 
Despite its weakness and fragility as a state that cannot 
protect its own nation, the Angolan regime still controls 
the legislative branch and they are legally restricting 
civil society. They are not drafting laws to stop NGOs 
deliberately but they are employing the rigid, nepotistic 
bureaucracy to impede their progress and stop their work 
(Santos, 2002, p. 48).   
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Angolan NGOs were successful on some fronts, one of 
which is the ethnic conflict. They were able to introduce 
peace, maintain it through civic education and raise 
awareness about the importance of essential freedoms, 
basic human rights and political rights, which was a 
relatively successful formula in fighting remnants of 
civil war. They were successful in working with each 
other, through merging the areas they tackle and they 
were also able to work with international organizations. 
One could see, though, that Angolan NGOs do not work 
parallel to UN bodies but under them. It could be argued 
that Angolan NGOs are not autonomous. They are 
heavily subordinated to some international organizations 
and subject to control by the Angolan state which limits 
NGOs’ power and the extent of their influence. 
However, that does not mean that civil society is not 
effective in Angola. So far, it might not be significantly 
successful in reconstructing Angola as a fragile state. 
However it is inducing progress in terms of the civic 
duty. They are building what one might call ‘the right 
things in the heart’ which is the essence of democracy. 
They are not only educating the masses about their rights 
and responsibilities but also pressuring the government 
to hold elections. They are not only tackling economic 
growth but also democracy. They might not be 
democratizing yet, but they are slowly pushing for 
liberalization. In parallel to that they are building the 
bases for a full democracy. There is hope for civil 
society in Angola and there is hope that it achieves the 
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Data compiled from: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015 
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